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A SEISMIC SHIFT? AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA ON 





The media landscape is undergoing profound change, on an unprecedented scale and 
at an exponential pace, at the forefront of which, is new media1. This communication 
revolution has been recognised within a variety of international arenas. For instance, 
in 2011, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee (HRC) stated: 
 
‘[I]nternet and mobile based electronic information dissemination systems, have 
substantially changed communication practices around the world. There is now a 
global network for exchanging ideas and opinions that does not necessarily rely on 
the traditional mass media intermediaries.’2 
 
On UN World Press Day in 2012, Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, President of the UN 
General Assembly, said: “Governments that try to suppress or shut-down new media 
platforms should rather embrace new media for the beneficial transformation of their 
societies” 3 . Further, in early 2014, the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications Report on Media Plurality recognised the increasingly important 
role that new media is playing within society4. These views have been mirrored in the 
United States (US), where the influence of, specifically, social media was summed up 
by the Criminal Court of the City of New York in New York v Harris: “The reality of 
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1 P. Coe, ‘The social media paradox: an intersection with freedom of expression and the criminal law’, 
Information & Communications Technology Law, (2015), Vol. 24, Issue 1, 16-40, 16 
2  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Freedoms of opinion and expression, 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (GC 34) 12th September 2011, [15]; See also, O’Flaherty, ‘Freedom of Expression: 
Article 19 of the ICCPR and Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34’, (2012) 12 Human 
Rights Law Review 627 
3 UN Highlights Role of Press Freedom as Catalyst for Social and Political Change, UN News Centre, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41911&Cr=journalist&Cr1 accessed 28th April 2014 
4  House of Lords Select Committee on Communications 1st Report of Session 2013-14, Media 
Plurality, 4th February 2014, [46]-[52] 
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today’s world is that social media, whether it be Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, 
Google+ or any other site, is the way people communicate”5.  
New media has changed the way in which we communicate, giving rise to a 
culture of sharing and voluntariness6. Thus, according to Van Dijck, social media, in 
particular, has created a new: “online layer through which people organise their 
lives…this layer of platforms influences human interaction on an individual and 
community level, as well as on a larger societal level, while the worlds of online and 
offline are increasingly interpenetrating.”7 Yet, despite the accepted impact of new 
media on the way in which expression is communicated and received, Lord Justice 
Leveson devoted only ten of two thousand pages of his Inquiry into the Culture, 
Practices and Ethics of the Press to internet publications8. This is surprising bearing 
in mind, the reach of new media, and how its use compares to traditional media, in 
particular the press industry9. Indeed, Leveson LJ, in his Inquiry, makes reference to 
the ability of new media, and specifically blogs and social networking sites, to reach 
vast amounts of people10.  His Lordship also states that the internet is an: “ethical 
vacuum…[that] does not claim to operate by express ethical standards, so that 
bloggers and others may, if they choose, act with impunity.” 11  Specifically, the 
Inquiry recognises that  “[b]logs and other such websites are entirely unregulated”12 
and that other new media companies, including social networking sites operate under 
                                                             
5 New York v Harris, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1871 *3, note 3 (Crim. Ct. City of N.Y., N.Y. County, 
2012) 
6  D.R. Stewart (ed), Social Media and the Law, (Routledge, 2013), viii; C. Shirky, Here Comes 
Everybody, (Allen Lane, 2008), 17 
7 J. Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity A Critical History of Social Media, (Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 4 
8 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 2012, 
168-177; 736-737. The Inquiry refers to: ‘…blogs, online news aggregators, publishers, social network 
sites and online hosts’ [4.1] 
9 P. Coe, ‘The social media paradox: an intersection with freedom of expression and the criminal law’, 
Information & Communications Technology Law, (2015), Vol. 24, Issue 1, 16-40, 21-24 
10 In relation to blogs, his Lordship refers to Guido Fawkes that, according to its founder, Paul Staines, 
can, when big stories are being broken, be visited by up to 100,000 people per hour.  Leveson LJ also 
makes specific reference to the usage of social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter. See Lord 
Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 2012, 168, 
[4.3]-[4.4], 173, [5.2] respectively 
11 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 
2012, 736, [3.2] 
12 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 
2012, 171, [4.20]. His Lordship does acknowledge that the Huffington Post UK is unique in having (at 
the time) voluntarily subscribed to the Press Complaints Commission and abided by the Editors’ Code 
of Practice 
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different national laws, depending on where they are domiciled, consequently giving 
rise to issues concerning conflicts of law13. 
 This paper seeks to explore impact of new media on perceptions of freedom of 
expression, media freedom and privacy. It will, firstly, through analysis of European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and US jurisprudence and scholarship, 
comparatively explore the traditional purpose of the media, and how ‘media freedom’, 
as opposed to freedom of expression, has been subject to privileged protection, within 
a ECHR context at least. The emergence of new media, and how it has potentially 
altered perceptions of privacy at an individual and societal level is then considered, 
alongside analysis of how it can be differentiated from the traditional media. This is 
followed by consideration of the philosophical justifications for freedom of 
expression, and how they enable a workable definition of the media based upon the 
concept of the media-as-a-constitutional-component. 
2. MEDIA FREEDOM 
2.1 MEDIA FREEDOM AS A DISTINCT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The traditional professional media, including the printed press, television, radio and 
film industry, continues to benefit from significant protection beyond that afforded to 
private individuals and non-media organisations. This position is evident within a 
number of jurisdictions. For example, pursuant to Article 11(2) of the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU)14, ‘freedom and pluralism of the media 
shall be respected’. In Germany, Article 5(1)2 of the German Basic Law provides a separate 
provision for the specific protection of media expression, thus creating a clear distinction with 
free expression guarantees for private individuals: ‘[f]reedom of the press and freedom of 
reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed’15. Similarly, in the US, the 
                                                             
13 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 
2012, 174-177 
14 The Charter was initially solemnly proclaimed at the Nice European Council on 7th December 2000. 
At that time, it did not have any binding legal effect. However, on 1st December 2009, with the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter became legally binding on the European Union 
institutions and on national governments: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/charter/index_en.htm accessed 3rd April 2015 
15 See generally: J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) 
JML 57-78, 59; E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 417-419 
 4 
First Amendment states that: ‘[c]ongress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press…’16.  
Within a ECHR context, freedom of expression is protected by Article 10(1), and 
qualified by Article 10(2): 
(1): Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States 
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
 (2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Although Article 10(1) does not specifically provide for protection of media freedom 
in distinction to that of private individuals and non-media institutions, in interpreting 
Article 10, the ECtHR has attached great importance to the role of the media17 . 
Accordingly, the media’s contribution to democracy and democratic self-
governance18, and its ‘role of public watchdog’19 have been clearly established by the 
jurisprudence of the Court. Indeed, it recognises a duty on the media to convey 
information and ideas on political issues and public interest20, and the right of the 
public to receive this information21. 
                                                             
16 However, despite a specific free press clause, the US position is very different, and is discussed 
below 
17 For example, see: Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [59]; Bergens 
Tidande v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [48]; Busuioc v Moldova (2006) 42 EHRR 14, [64]-[65]; 
Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1; Janowski v Poland (No 1) (2000) 29 EHRR 705, [32] 
18 For example, see: Perna v Italy (2004) 39 EHRR 28 
19 The Observer and The Guradian v United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153, [59]; Goodwin v United 
Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, [39]; Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, [63]; Bladet 
Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [62] 
20 Lingens v Austria (186) 8 EHRR 103, [26]; Oberschlick v Austria (No 1) (1991) 19 EHRR 389, [58]; 
Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, [43]; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843; 
Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, [31] 
21 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, [65]; Fressoz and Roire v France (2001) 31 
EHRR 2, [51]; Bergens Tidande v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [52] 
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 The special position of the media in relation to freedom of expression, 
recognised by commentators such as Stewart J, Bezanson and West22, explains why 
the jurisprudence of, for instance, the ECtHR, interprets Article 10(1) to contain 
privileged protection of the media, even in the absence of express provisions to that 
effect. Media freedom is, therefore, ‘special’ because a journalist or media company 
is: “governed by a different set of factors concerning the scope and intensity of 
protection when preparing, editing or issuing a publication, compared to freedom of 
expression afforded to private individuals or non-media entities”23. Thus, the fact that 
a statement can be classed as media expression, as opposed to expression by a private 
individual or non-media institution, adds to the burden of justifying its restrictions24. 
 In Vejdeland and others v Sweden25 the applicants, who were not associated 
with the media, had been convicted for distributing homophobic leaflets in a 
secondary school. The ECtHR upheld the convictions, whilst observing: “[i]f exactly 
the same words and phrases were to be used in public newspapers…they would 
probably not be considered a matter for criminal prosecution and condemnation”26. 
Thus, the special protection afforded to media expression permits the use of wide 
discretion as to the methods and techniques adopted to report on matters, and how that 
material is subsequently presented 27 . It allows the media to have recourse to 
exaggeration and even provocation 28 , including the use of strong terminology or 
polemic formulations29. Additionally, the ECtHR has held that this protection extends 
beyond the dissemination of the journalist’s or media organisation’s own opinions, to 
encapsulate those expressed by third parties in the context of, for example, 
interviews30.  
                                                             
22 P. Stewart J, ‘Or of the Press’, (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 631, 633; R.P. Bezanson, ‘The New 
Free Press Guarantee’ (1977) 63 Virginia Law Review 731, 733; S.R. West, ‘Awakening the Press 
Clause’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law Review 1025, 1032. The US position is discussed in more detail below 
23 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 59 
24 ibid. 
25 [2012] ECHR 242 
26 [2012] ECHR 242 per Judge Vucancic at [12] 
27 Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, [31]; Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 
125, [63]; Bergens Tidande v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [57] 
28 Prager and Oberschlick v Austria (1995) 21 EHRR 1, [38]; Thoma v Luxembourg (2003) 36 EHRR 
21, [45]-[46]; R. Clayton QC and H. Tomlinson QC, Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2nd ed. 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 271 [15.254] 
29 Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, [67]; Oberschlick v Austria (No 2) (1998) 25 
EHRR 357, [33]; J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) 
JML 57-78, 59 
30 Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1 
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 The ambit of media freedom is not limited to stronger protection for media 
publications; instead, it extends to rights that are not, in any way, available pursuant 
to freedom of expression guarantees. Consequently, media freedom and freedom of 
expression differ in relation to the intensity of the protection and in respect of the 
scope of the protected action. According to Oster, this position equates to institutional 
protection of the media that, sequentially, guarantees rights that are not exclusively 
concerned with expression, but also relate to the media vis-a-vis its newsgathering or 
editorial activities, or even to the existence of an independent media31.  
Oster categorises the right to media freedom as being both defensive, in that it 
protects the media against interference, such as state action, and positive, as it entitles 
the media to state protection32. This categorisation is animated by reference to a non-
exhaustive list of ECtHR jurisprudence33. For instance, in relation to the defensive 
category, in Halis Dogan and others v Turkey, the Court held that media freedom 
includes the protection of the newspaper distribution infrastructure34. The case of 
Gsell v Switzerland35 involved restrictions on road access to the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, consequently the Court recognised the existence of protection 
against state measures that could impinge upon the exercise of the journalist’s 
profession. It has also been held that journalists cannot be made to give evidence 
concerning confidential information or sources, even if it has been obtained 
illegally 36 . They are also exempt from certain data protection and copyright 
provisions37. With regard to the positive category, states are required to: protect the 
media through the safeguarding of media pluralism38; protect journalists from acts of 
violence in the course of their work 39 , and from undue influence by financially 
powerful groups40 or the government41.  
                                                             
31 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 60 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 60-61 
34 Halis Dogan and others v Turkey Application no. 50693/99 (ECtHR, 10th January 2006), [24] 
35 [2009] ECHR 1465 
36 Goodwin v United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 16, [39]; Radio Twist as v Slovakia [2006] ECHR 1129, 
[62]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v Netherlands [2010] ECHR 1273, [50] 
37  For example, see: Article 9 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L281/31; Article 5(3)(c) 
Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC, OJ L167/19 
38 Informationsverein Lentia and others v Austria [1993] ECHR 57, [32]-[34]; TV Vest & Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v Norway [2008] ECHR 1687, [78] 
39 Ozgur Gundem v Turkey [2000] ECHR 104, [38 ff] 
40 Article 21(4)(2) EC Merger Regulation 139/2004, OJ L24/1; Part 5 Chapter 2 Communications Act 
2003 ch 21 
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In contrast to ECHR jurisprudence, the position in the US is markedly 
different 42 . Despite leading commentators 43 , and dissenting Supreme Court 
judgments44 arguing that the specific free press clause ‘or of the press’ in the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution creates a similar distinction to that provided by 
the CFREU, the German Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the ECHR, this has been 
opposed by academics such as Volokh 45 , and resisted by the Supreme Court 46 . 
Consequently, the dominant view in the US is based on the press-as-technology 
model. This model has roots in English common law47, and is founded on the premise 
that media freedom should not be subject to privileges or duties over and above 
freedom of expression48.  According to Volokh, freedom of the press is technological. 
It is, therefore, available to all forms of communication classed as technologies, 
which covers everything49. In Volokh’s assessment, freedom of the press does not just 
protect the press industry, but secures the right of everyone to use communications 
                                                                                                                                                                              
41 Manole v Moldova [2009] ECHR 1292, [109]; Centro Europa 7 Srl and Di Stefano v Italy App no 
38433/09 (ECtHR, 7th June 2012), [133] 
42 The US view is worthy of consideration at this juncture, as it provides useful parallels with the 
ECHR position that animates the debate on how the media is defined and how the courts can determine 
who or what should benefit from media freedom. This is discussed in more detail at section 2.8 below 
43 See generally: M.B. Nimmer, ‘Introduction – Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it 
Add to Freedom of Speech?’ (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 631; C.E. Baker, Human Liberty and 
Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 1989), chs. 10-11; R.P. Bezanson, ‘Whither Freedom of 
the Press?’ 97 Iowa Law Review 1259; See also: T.B. Dyk, ‘Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First 
Amendment’, 44 Stanford Law Review 927, 931-932 (1992); P. Horwitz, ‘Universities as First 
Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions’, 54 UCLA Law Review, 1497, 1505 
(2007); S.R. West, ‘Awakening the Press Clause’, 58 UCLA Law Review 1025, 1027-1029 (2011); For 
judicial argument see: P. Stewart J, ‘Or of the Press’, (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 631, 634 
44 See the dissenting judgments of: Stevens J in Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct 876, 951 n 57 (2010); 
Powell J in Saxbe v Wash Post Co 417 US 843, 863 (1974); Douglas J Branzburg v Hayes 408 US 665, 
721 (1972)  
45 E. Volokh, ‘Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to 
Today’, (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459 
46 For example, see the majority decision in Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct, 905; See also: E. Volokh, 
‘Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today’, 
(2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459, 506-510 for a summary of other Supreme 
Court cases that have held the same 
47 R v Shipley (Dean of Saint Asaph’s Case) (1784) 21 How. St. Tr. 847 (KB); R v Rowan (1794) 22 
How. St .Tr. 1033 (KB); R v Burdett (1820) 106 Eng. Rep. 873 (KB), 887; 4 B. & Ald. 95, 132; see 
generally: E. Volokh, ‘Freedom of the Press as an Industry, or From the Press as a Technology’ (2011-
12) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459, 484-489 
48 For example, see: D.L. Lange, ‘The Speech and Press Clauses’ (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 77; 
WW van Alstyne, ‘the Hazards to the Press of Claiming a “Preferred Position” (1977) 28 Hastings Law 
Journal 761, 768-669; A. Lewis, ‘A Preferred Position for Journalism’ (1978-9) 7 Hofstra Law Review 
595; C.E. Baker ‘Press Performance, Human Rights, and Private Power as a Threat’ (2011) 5 Law & 
Ethics of Human Rights 219, 230; E. Volokh, ‘Freedom of the Press as an Industry, or From the Press 
as a Technology’ (2011-12) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459, 538-539 
49 R.P. Bezanson, ‘Whither Freedom of the Press?’ 97 Iowa Law Review 1259 
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technology50. Therefore, the ambit of the model extends to, not only the traditional 
media, and professional journalists utilising new media, but also to un-trained citizen 
journalists, who communicate via mediums such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and 
YouTube51.  
This originalist interpretation 52  is prevalent in US jurisprudence and 
scholarship, both historically53 and currently. Despite the Supreme Court recognising 
that the press operates ‘as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by government 
officials’54, it continues to reject the argument that the institutional press has any 
constitutional privilege in excess of other speakers55. Thus, the majority in Citizens 
United v FEC56, echoing previous judgments of Brennan J57, agreed that the First 
Amendment protects ‘speech’58, as opposed to the source of that expression, whether 
that emanates from a professional journalist or a casual Twitter user59.  
                                                             
50 E. Volokh, ‘Freedom of the Press as an Industry, or From the Press as a Technology’ (2011-12) 160 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459, 462-463 
51 The press-as-technology model has been given other labels, including: ‘the equivalence model’, 
which is based on the premise that courts, in a number of jurisdictions, seem to recognise that free 
speech claims of the media are indistinguishable from speakers generally (see: H. Fenwick and G. 
Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University Press, 2006), 20-25; the 
‘neutrality doctrine’, that stems from the notion that the state is under an obligation to be neutral, in 
relation to the mass media and speakers generally, in granting free speech rights (see: A. Lewis, ‘A 
Preferred Position for Journalism?’ 7 Hofstra Law Review 595, 599-605; compare with: M.J. Rooney, 
‘Freedom of the Press: An Emerging Privilege’ (1983) 67 Marquette Law Review 34, 52-56) 
52 See: D. Anderson, ‘The Origins of the Press Clause’ (1982-3) 30 UCLA Law Review 455; E. Volokh, 
‘Freedom of the Press as an Industry, or From the Press as a Technology’ (2011-12) 160 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 459; D.L. Lange, ‘The Speech and Press Clauses’ (1975) 23 UCLA Law 
Review 77, 88-99; A. Lewis, ‘A Preferred Position for Journalism’ (1978-9) 7 Hofstra Law Review 
595, 600; R.P. Bezanson, ‘Whither Freedom of the Press?’ 97 Iowa Law Review 1259 
53  Republica v Oswald 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Pa. 1788); Commonwealth v Freeman, HERALD OF 
FREEDOM (Boston), Mar. 18, 1791, at 5 (Mass. 1791); In re Fries. 9 F. Cas. 826, 839 (Justice Iredell, 
Circuit Judge, C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (no. 5126); Runkle v Meyer 3 Yeates 518, 519 (Pa. 1803); see 
generally: E. Volokh, ‘Freedom of the Press as an Industry, or From the Press as a Technology’ (2011-
12) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459, 465-468 
54 Mills v Alabama 384 US 214, 219 (1966); see also: Estes v Texas 381 US 532, 539 (1965) 
55 Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct 876, 905 (2010); Associated Press v United States 326 US 1, 7 
(1945); Branzburg v Hayes 408 US 665, 704 (1972); Pell v Procunier 417 US 817, 834 (1974); Saxbe 
v Washington Post Company 417 US 843, 848-849; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller 397 F 3d 964 
(DC Cir 2005), cert denied 125 S Ct 2977 (2005) 
56 130 S Ct 876 (2010) 
57 For example, see: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 US 749, 781 (1985)  
58 Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct 876, 905 (2010) (Scalia J concurring) 
59 However, the model is not immune to criticism and opposing views, from both US Supreme Court 
judges, and legal scholars. For example, see generally:  Bartnicki v Vopper 532 US 514 (2001); 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v Minn. Comm’r of Revenue 460 US 575, 592-93 (1983); Gertz v 
Robert Welch Inc 418 US 323 (1974); see the dissenting judgments in Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct 
876 (2010) (in particular Stevens J at 951 n. 57); Powell J’s dissenting judgment in Saxbe v 
Washington Post Company 417 US 843, 863 (1974); Douglas J’s dissenting judgment in Branzburg v 
Hayes 408 US 665, 721 (1972); Stewart J, ‘Or of the Press’ 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 634 (1975); T. Dyk, 
‘Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment’ 44 Stan. L. Rev 927, 931-932 (1992); P. 
Horwitz, ‘Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions’ 54 
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 This section has established, within a ECHR context at least, the distinction 
between the freedom of expression right afforded to private individuals compared 
with that of non-media institutions, pursuant to media freedom: if the expression 
emanates from a media entity, whether that be a journalist, or a media company, it 
will be subject to the privileged protection set out above; to the contrary, if the 
expression comes from a non-media entity, it will, nonetheless, be subject to general 
freedom of expression protection. Furthermore, only journalists and media 
organisations can take advantage of the freedom bestowed upon the media as an 
institution, for example, with regard to newsgathering activities60. 
3. THE TRANSITONAL ERA: THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA AND THE AGE OF 
NEW MEDIA 
3.1 THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
The origins of the traditional media, and in particular the press industry, may well be 
founded on freedom of expression philosophy61, and the notion that, as ‘the Fourth 
Estate’, its primary function is to act as a ‘public watchdog’,62 in that it operates as the 
general public’s “eyes and ears” by investigating and reporting abuses of power63. 
Prior to the evolution of the internet into a network available throughout the world64 
                                                                                                                                                                              
UCLA L. Rev. 1497, 1505 (2007); S. West, ‘Awakening the Press Clause’ 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1025, 
1027-1029 (2011). See also Bezanson’s rejoinder to Volokh’s article: R.P. Bezanson, ‘Whither 
Freedom of the Press?’ 97 Iowa Law Review 1259. These criticisms are discussed in more detail at 
section 2.8 below in relation to how the courts should determine who and what can benefit from ‘media 
freedom’ 
60 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 61-
62 
61 See section 5.2 below 
62 Observer and Guardian v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 153, [59] 
63 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 183 per Sir John Donaldson MR; See 
also: E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 418 
64 The evolution of the internet is borne out by recent Office for National Statistics data, which states 
that, in 2013, 83% of British households had internet access. Thirty-six million (73%) adults in Britain 
used the internet every day, equating to twenty million more than in 2006; with 53% using a mobile 
phone to access it remotely, more than double 2010’s figure of 24% (Indeed, if you add “portable 
computers” to this, the percentage of people accessing the internet ‘on the go’ in 2013 rises to 61%: 
Office for National Statistics, Internet Access – Households and Individuals, 2013, 8th August 2013 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_322713.pdf accessed 19th May 2015). These figures are 
reflected by recent statistics from the US and the EU. As of May 2013, 80% of American adults had 
either a broadband connection at home, or a smartphone, or both (The 80% breaks down as follows: 
46% have both home broadband connection and a smartphone; 24% have home broadband connection 
but no smartphone; 10% have a smartphone, but not home broadband connection: K. Zickurh and A. 
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and, in particular, the new media revolution, which transformed that network into an 
accessible form of mass media, creating an audience and producer convergence65, 
traditional press and broadcast (television or radio) companies were the only media 
institutions that had the ability to reach mass audiences through regular publication or 
broadcasts66. Consequently, as observed by Leveson LJ in his Inquiry, in recent years, 
the traditional media, and in particular the press, has played a critical role in 
informing the public on matters of public interest and concern 67 . Furthermore, 
because of the traditional media’s ability to reach so many people, for the purposes of 
media protection, it was relatively easy to distinguish between expression conveyed 
by a media entity, to that communicated by a private individual68.  
However, in contrast to Leveson LJ’s examples of high quality investigative 
public interest journalism69, there is no doubt that an increasing number of print and 
broadcast media outlets choose to engage with ‘sexy’ stories that sell, as opposed to 
reporting on matters of public concern70; a position that clearly correlates with the 
criticisms advanced below of Holmes J’s marketplace of ideas theory71 . Thus, a 
number of commentators have argued that the media’s public watchdog role gradually 
diminished towards the end of the twentieth century. Instead, the focus shifted onto 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Smith, Home Broadband 2013, PewResearch Internet Project, 26th August 2013  
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/26/home-broadband-2013/; A. Smith, Smartphone Ownership 
2013, PewResearch Internet Project, 5th June 2013, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-ownership-2013/ both accessed 19th May 2015). 
In 2012, the percentage of individuals in the EU who used the internet was 73%, 30% of which gained 
access via mobile devices away from home or work (H. Seybert, Internet use in households and by 
individuals in 2012, Eurostat, 2012 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-
050/EN/KS-SF-12-050-EN.PDF accessed 19th May 2015). Worldwide, the estimated number of 
internet users exceeds two billion (F. La Rue, Report of the Human Rights Council’s Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
A/HRC/17/27, 16th May 2011, [21]; See also: UN General Assembly Human Rights Council, The 
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, Resolution 20/8, 
A/HRC/RES/20/8, 29th June 2012, [2]). 
65 See generally: A. Bruns, Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life and Beyond: From Production to Produsage, 
(Peter Lang Publishing, 2008) 
66 See generally: J. Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity A Critical History of Social Media, (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 3-23 
67 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 
2012, 455-470 
68 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 62 
69 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 
2012, 455-470 
70 Numerous examples are provided by Leveson LJ in his Inquiry: Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry 
into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 2012, 539-591 
71 See section 5.4 below 
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the commercially viable stories referred to above 72 . It is submitted that media 
ownership, and the power derived from it, means that there is a constant conflict 
between the traditional media’s role as a watchdog, or gatekeeper, and commercial 
reality. Indeed, it has been observed that, during the twentieth century, there has been 
a dilution of news media ownership, which is now vested in a relatively small number 
of large and powerful companies. Accordingly, this ownership concentration has had 
a detrimental affect on investigative journalism73. To the contrary, as will be seen 
below, citizen journalists, through the use of new media are, in many instances, 
replacing the traditional media as the public’s watchdog. 
3.2 THE AGE OF TRANSITION: NEW MEDIA – A CHANGE OF PERCEPTION 
Until relatively recently, the public were, to a great extent, limited as to what they 
were exposed to reading or seeing, by what large proportions of the traditional media 
chose to publish or broadcast. As set out above, such decisions may have come down 
to editorial control, based on, for instance, owner or political bias, commercial 
revenue, or both, rather than being based on the results of sound investigative 
journalism 74 . However, the new media revolution, which has facilitated the 
convergence of audience and producer, and enabled this new breed of citizen 
journalist to communicate with, potentially, millions of people, means that the ability 
to reach mass audiences is no longer something that is monopolised by traditional 
                                                             
72  For example, see: C. Calvert and M. Torres, ‘Putting the Shock Value in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence: When Freedom for the Citizen-Journalist Watchdog Trumps the Right of Informational 
Privacy on the Internet’ (2011) Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 323, 341; J. 
Curran and J. Seaton, Power Without Responsibility – Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain, 
(7th ed. Routledge, 2010), 96-98; E. Cashmore, Celebrity Culture, (2nd ed. Routledge, 2014) 
73 S.L. Carter, ‘Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent’ (1983-1984) Yale Law 
Journal 581, 600-607; P. Garry, ‘The First Amendment and Freedom of the Press: A Revised 
Approach to the Marketplace of Ideas Concept’ (1989) 72 Marquette Law Review 187, 189; See also 
Leveson LJ’s assessment of the commercial pressures on the press: Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry 
into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 2012, 93-98 
74 This criticism is advanced by Barendt with regard to the marketplace of ideas theory (dealt with at 
section 2.3 above): E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 12; See 
also: Similar issues have arisen in the print press with regard to commercial advertising. For example, 
in January 2015, a number of Daily Telegraph journalists voiced their concerns over the newspaper 
allegedly discouraging them from writing unfavourable stories about advertising and commercial 
partners. Furthermore, the journalists provided examples to Newsnight of how commercial concerns 
impacted upon coverage given to China and Russia. See: C. Cook, More Telegraph writers voice 
concern, 19th February 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-31529682 accessed 19th May 2015 
74 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-32582337 accessed 5th May 2015 
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media institutions and, therefore, cannot be relied upon to distinguish between media 
and non-media entities75. 
New media platforms have changed the traditional media landscape forever, as 
they have altered our perceptions of the limits of communication, the reception of 
information and the parameters of what amounts to privacy and our own private lives. 
It is no longer the case that communication is constrained by boundaries, such as 
location, time, space or culture76, or dictated by a media organisation’s ownership, 
political bias or commercial partners77. Access to multiple new media outlets and 
platforms twenty-four hours a day, that are instantaneously accessible, allows users, 
forming what Benkler refers to as the “networked public sphere”78, to transmit and 
receive information to one and other, via platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook, 
Twitter, WhatsApp and Snapchat, without the need to consider, what have become, 
the boundaries and restrictions mentioned above79. When in place, these boundaries 
acted as a natural filtration system for news, information, or simply the sharing and 
venting of thoughts and feelings. Their dilution has enabled real-time relationships to 
exist without any physical interaction 80 . Consequently, Professor McLuhan’s 
proclamation, that the “medium is the message”81, seems both prophetic and entirely 
apt for the new media era as, according to McLuhan, the media is an extension of 
ourselves, and new mediums introduced into our lives give rise to personal and social 
consequences, as a result of that new ‘extension’82. Accordingly: “the message of any 
                                                             
75 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 63 
76 See generally: F. Webster, Theories of the Information Society, (4th ed, Routledge, 2014), 20; I. 
Barron and R. Curnow, The Future with Microelectronics: Forecasting the Effects of Information 
Technology, (Pinter, 1979); G. Mulgan, Communication and Control: Networks and the New 
Economies of Communication, (Polity, 1991) 
77 For example, see: C. Cook, More Telegraph writers voice concern, 19th February 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-31529682 accessed 19th May 2015; See also: E. Barendt, Freedom 
of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 12 
77 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-32582337 accessed 5th May 2015 
78 Y. Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (Yale University Press, 2006), 212 
79 See generally: B. Wellman, ‘Physical Space and Cyberspace: The Rise of Personalised Networking’, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(2), 227-51; P. Coe, ‘The social media 
paradox: an intersection with freedom of expression and the criminal law’, Information & 
Communications Technology Law, (2015), Vol. 24, Issue 1, 16-40, 21-22 
80 B. Wellman, ‘Physical Space and Cyberspace: The Rise of Personalised Networking’, International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(2), 227-51 
81 M. McLuhan, Understanding Media The Extensions of Man (MIT Press, 1964), 7 
82 Ibid.  
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medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into 
human affairs” 83. 
These platforms are used as a way of, not only receiving news 84 , but of 
instantaneously, and often spontaneously, without filter, expressing opinions and 
venting and sharing emotions, thoughts and feelings,85 circumventing the mass media, 
and giving rise to a convergence of audience and producer86. This is illustrated by 
using statistics to compare the use of new media with traditional media. For example, 
the New York Times 2013 print and digital circulation was approximately two 
million87, enabling it to proclaim that it was the “#1 individual newspaper site” on the 
internet, with nearly thirty-one million unique visitors per month 88 . In contrast, 
YouTube, which is owned by Google, has one billion unique visitors per month89 
which, according to Ammori, equates to: “thirty times more than the New York Times, 
or as many unique visitors in a day as the [New York] Times has every month”90. 
According to WordPress’ statistics, it hosts blogs written in over 120 languages, 
equating to over 409 million users viewing more than 15.8 billion pages each month. 
Consequently, users produce approximately 43.7 million new posts and 58.8 million 
new comments on a monthly basis. These users can choose to create and maintain 
anonymous blogs 91 . Twitter states that it normally ‘takes in’ approximately 500 
million Tweets per day, equating to an average of 5,700 Tweets per second92. It has 
more visitors per week than the New York Times does in a month 93 . Similarly, 
                                                             
83 McLuhan Understanding Media The Extensions of Man (MIT Press, 1964), 8 
84 According to Ofcom’s report, The Communications Market 2013 (at para. 1.9.7), 23% of people use 
social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, for news: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/UK_1.pdf accessed 19th March 2014 
85 Indeed, in April 2014 Facebook emailed its users to inform them that the messages function is 
moving out of the Facebook application due to their Messenger application enabling users to reply 20% 
faster than using Facebook.  
86 See generally: J. Rowbottom, ‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech’, C.L.J. 
2012, 71(2), 355-383, 365 
87 C. Haughney, Newspapers Post Gains in Digital Circulation, New York Times, 30th April 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/business/media/digital-subscribers-buoy-newspaper-
circulation.html accessed 19th May 2015 
88 New York Times Media Kit, http://perma.cc/B5KA-VMGC accessed 12th September 2014 
89 Statistics YouTube, http://perma.cc/S8W5-ZRM4, accessed 19th May 2015 
90 M. Ammori, ‘The “new” New York Times: Free speech lawyering in the age of Google and Twitter’, 
Harvard Law Review, 2014, vol. 127: 2259-2295, 2266 
91 http://en.wordpress.com/stats/ accessed 19th May 2015 
92 https://blog.twitter.com/2013/new-tweets-per-second-record-and-how accessed 9th January 2015 
93 M. Ammori, ‘The “new” New York Times: Free speech lawyering in the age of Google and Twitter’, 
Harvard Law Review, 2014, vol. 127: 2259-2295, 2266 
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Tumblr hosts over 170 million microblogs94 and, with 300 million visits per month, 
enjoys ten times more than the New York Times95. According to Facebook, as of 30th 
September 2014, it had 1.35 billion monthly active users, 703 million of which use 
their mobile applications to access the platform on a daily basis96. Late 2013 saw 
Instagram’s global usage expand by 15%, in just two months, to 150 million people97. 
By December 2014, this had increased to 300 million 98 . LinkedIn’s current 
membership is 300 million99. These established platforms are only the ‘tip of the new 
media iceberg’. Pinterest continues to grow rapidly100, as do emerging platforms, such 
as Snapchat and WhatsApp101. Consequently, for many people, new media platforms 
have not just replaced the written word; they have become a substitute for the spoken 
word102. 
This ‘reach’ of new media amplifies the way that the media, in general, 
envelopes our existence. Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have become an 
embodiment of McLuhan’s ‘extension of man’, and a facilitator of unfiltered 
expression, by being platforms for user speech, as opposed to that of a media 
organisation’s ownership, employees or political stance. Thus, traditional media 
organisations simply no longer monopolise the methods we use to find and facilitate 
news-gathering, communication or reception, or indeed how we express emotions, 
opinions and ideas. As a result, it has become an increasingly important source of 
news103  and both formal and informal method of communication. In light of the 
economic plight of the traditional media, commentators such as Oster and Calvert and 
                                                             
94 ibid. 2272 
95 J. Yarow, The Truth About Tumblr: Its Numbers Are Significantly Worse than You Think, Business 
Insider, 21st May 2013 http://www.businessinsider.com/tumblrs-active-users-lighter-than-expected-
2013-5 accessed 19th May 2015 
96 https://newsroom.fb.com/key-Facts accessed 19th May 2015 
97  http://instagram.com/press/#; UK Social Media Statistics for 2014, 
http://socialmediatoday.com/kate-rose-mcgrory/2040906/uk-social-media-statistics-2014, accessed 
19th May 2015 
98 http://instagram.com/press/# accessed 19th May 2015 
99  https://press.linkedin.com/site-resources/news-releases/2014/linkedin-reaches-300-million-members-
worldwide accessed 19th May 2015 
100 In 2011/2012 Pinterest had approximately 200,000 users in the UK. In the summer of 2013 this had 
grown to over 2 million: http://socialmediatoday.com/kate-rose-mcgrory/2040906/uk-social-media-
statistics-2014, accessed 19th May 2015 
101 Ibid.  
102 P. Coe, ‘The social media paradox: an intersection with freedom of expression and the criminal 
law’, Information & Communications Technology Law, (2015), Vol. 24, Issue 1, 16-40, 24 
103 See generally: L. Durity, ‘Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”: The Need to Protect Newsgathering 
Despite the Distribution Medium’ (2006) 5 Duke Law & Technology Review 1; J.S. Alonzo, ‘Restoring 
the Ideal Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as Journalists Can save the Press’ (2006) 9 New 
York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 751, 754 
 15 
Torres observe the ascendence of citizen journalism. This new breed of journalist is 
increasingly playing the role of public watchdog, and aiding democratic participation. 
By enriching public discourse through the reporting of matters of public interest and 
concern104 it is a paradigm of the argument from democratic self-governance105.  For 
example, the death of Osama Bin Laden was leaked on Twitter, before being 
published by any newspaper106. Edward Snowden disclosed information regarding 
American surveillance programmes to blogger Glenn Greenwald, as he did not trust 
the New York Times to publish the material107. Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad, 
and his opposing rebels distribute competing propaganda via Instagram108. Chelsea 
Manning, the US soldier convicted in 2013 for, inter alia, offences pursuant to the 
Espionage Act, leaked classified documents to WikiLeaks, as opposed to a 
‘traditional’ media outlet 109 . As a result of the importance attributed to citizen 
journalism, this new breed of journalist has even gained official recognition as 
‘press’110. Incidentally, traditional media companies are now, largely, operating online 
outlets in addition to their ‘staple’ method of communication, whilst companies such 
as the Huffington Post, which may be classed as ‘traditional professional’ media, 
operate exclusively online111. 
 
Thus, never before has a form of media changed the ‘scale, pace or pattern’ of 
human affairs to such an extent, within such a short period of time.112 It is clear that 
                                                             
104 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 
63; 
C. Calvert and M. Torres, ‘Putting the Shock Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence: When Freedom 
for the Citizen-Journalist Watchdog Trumps the Right of Informational Privacy on the Internet’ (2011) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 323, 344 
105 See section 5.6 below 
106  B. Shelter, How the Bin Laden Announcement Leaked Out, New York Times, 1st May 2011, 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/how-the-osama-announcement-leaked-
out/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 accessed 19th May 2015 
107 M. Ammori, ‘The “new” New York Times: Free speech lawyering in the age of Google and 
Twitter’, Harvard Law Review, 2014, vol. 127: 2259-2295, 2265 
108  N. Gaouette, Assad on Instagram Vies with Rebel Videos to Seek Support, Bloomberg, 19th 
September 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-19/assad-on-instagram-vies-with-rebel-
videos-to-seek-support.html accessed 19th May 2015 
109 Y. Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (Yale University Press, 2006), 348 
110  See High Court of Ireland, Cornec v Morrice [2012] IEHC 376; K.Q. Seelye, White House 
Approves Press Pass for Blogger, New York Times, 7th March 2005 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/07/technology/07press.html?_r=0 accessed 19th May 2015 
111 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 63 
112 Consequently, Time magazine named ‘You’ the person of the year in 2006: “for seizing the reins of 
the global media, for founding and framing the new digital democracy, for working for nothing and 
beating the pros at their own game.” See: L. Grossman, You-Yes, You- Are TIME’S Person of the Year, 
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new media, as an extension of man, can liberate and empower individuals, regardless 
of social status113. It has borne millions of ‘publishers’ who are able to circumvent the 
traditional mass media, yet fulfil a vital constitutional function as citizen journalists. 
On the one hand, it is arguable that this can only be good for freedom of expression. 
These ‘publishers’ are not subject to the filter system discussed above and, for 
instance, political bias, censorship, the influence of media ownership or editorial 
control.  
 
On the other hand, this has a huge impact on individual and societal 
perceptions of privacy. The power that new media wields, quite literally in our hands, 
can intoxicate individuals, who are perhaps not prepared for the responsibility that 
comes with its use, and leads them to communicate as though they operate within a 
“‘Wild West’, law free zone in Cyberspace”114. According to McGoldrick, this has led 
to “catastrophic consequences” 115 . For example, individuals in the UK, and 
elsewhere, have been convicted of criminal offences116, investigated by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 117 , sued for defamation 118 , and have been subject to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Time, 25th December 2006, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570810,00.html 
accessed 19th May 2015 
113 D. McGoldrick, ‘The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Facebook and Social Networking Sites: 
A UK Perspective’, HRLR 13 (2013), 125-151,130; See also: Twitter’s fightback against depression, 
GQ Magazine, May 2014, 226. This article considers how the former professional footballer, Stan 
Collymore, used Twitter to document his depression to raise awareness of mental illness to help other 
sufferers; P. Bernal, ‘A defence of responsible tweeting’, Comms. L. (2014), 19(1), 12-19, 14-15.  
114 A. Yen, ‘Western Frontier or Feudal Society? Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace’, (2002) 17 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1207; See also G. Benaim, A future with social media: Wild West or 
Utopia? You have a stake in the outcome, http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/05/14/a-future-with-
social-media-wild-west-or-utopia-you-have-a-stake-in-the-outcome-gideon-benaim/ accessed 16th May 
2014 
115 D. McGoldrick, ‘The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Facebook and Social Networking Sites: 
A UK Perspective’, HRLR 13 (2013), 130-131 
116 For example, see R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312 
117 A 14-year-old Dutch girl was arrested by police in Rotterdam following a tweet made on 13 th April 
2014 to American Airlines, stating: “@AmericanAir hello my name’s Ibrahim and I’m from 
Afghanistan. I’m part of Al Qaida and on June 1st I’m gonna do something really big bye”. Following 
her arrest American Airlines confirmed that it would pass on the girl’s IP address to the FBI for 
investigation: See, A. Withnall, Twitter’s American Airlines ‘terror threat’ 14-year-old girl arrested by 
police in Rotterdam, The Independent, 14th April 2014 http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/twitters-american-airlines-terror-threat-14yearold-girl-arrested-by-police-in-
rotterdam-9259485.html; J. McCully, Terror on Twitter, 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/terror-on-twitter-jonathan-mccully/#more-26428 both 
accessed 30th April 2014 
118 For example, see: Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781; [2008] Info TLR 
318; Cairns v Modi [2012] EWHC 756 (QB); [2012] EWCA Civ 1382; Tilbrook v Parr [2012] EHHC 
1946 (QB). See also the recent Australian case of Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295 (Farley, a 
student, was ordered to pay Mickle, his teacher, A$105,000 in damages for tweets sent to his followers) 
judgment accessible via http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/pjudg?jgmtid=169992; In the USA, a 
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disciplinary proceedings, and in some cases, dismissal by their employer119. Thus, a 
consequence of the ubiquity and diversity of these platforms, and the way in which 
they have ingrained themselves within our social cultural fabric, is that habits, 
conventions and social norms, that were once informal and transitory manifestations 
of social life, are now infused within new media platforms. Our perceptions of the 
parameters of our private lives, and the privacy of others, continue to shift. 
Boundaries that were relatively clear and static have now become blurred. What were 
casual and ephemeral actions and/or acts of expression, such as conversing with 
friends or colleagues or swapping/displaying pictures, or exchanging thoughts that 
were once kept private or maybe shared with a select few, have now become 
formalised and permanent120. New media’s embodiment of the extension of man 
theory, and its transcendence of a physical filtration system, has meant that these 
actions and expressions are, in the click of mouse, or the flick of a finger, publicised 
for the world to see. They enter the “public domain, with the potential for long-lasting 
and far reaching-consequences”121.  
 
Yet, despite the pitfalls associated with using these platforms, as alluded to 
above, new media is now a vital, and often the preferred method of imparting and 
receiving news122. As Oster states, its contribution to matters of public interest cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Nevada court ordered the founder of a ‘revenge porn’ site to pay US$250,000 in damages for 
defamatory tweets stating that plaintiff was a pedophile who possessed child pornography: D, Lee, 
‘Revenge porn’ site owner Hunter Moore sued for defamation, 11th March 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21740386 accessed 30th April 2014. 
119 See generally, P. Landau, The antisocial network: why Facebook abuse is a matter for employers, 
The Guardian, 1st May 2012 http://www.theguardian.com/money/work-blog/2012/may/01/antisocial-
network-facebook-abuse-employers accessed 30th April 2014; There have also been a number of 
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action by their club and the Football Association following the use of social media. For example, see 
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tabloid-heaven-tim-lowles/#more-24668 accessed 30th April 2014; P. Coe, Social Media ‘faux pas’: 
there’s only one ‘tweeting’ winner, http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/11/06/social-media-faux-pas-
theres-only-one-tweeting-winner-peter-coe/#more-28332 accessed 1st December 2014 
120 J. Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity A Critical History of Social Media, (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 6-7 
121 Ibid. See also: J. Rowbottom, ‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital 
speech’, C.L.J. 2012, 71(2), 366-377; The case of the then 17-year-old Paris Brown who stood down 
as Youth Police and Crime Commissioner over tweets she made when she was 14 to 16 years-old V. 
Dodd, Youth crime commissioner Paris Brown stands down over Twitter row, The Guardian, 9th April 
2013, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/09/paris-brown-stands-down-twitter accessed 1st May 
2014 
122 According to Ofcom’s report, The Communications Market 2013, at [1.9.7], 23% of people use 
social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, for news: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/UK_1.pdf accessed 19th May 2015 
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be overrated, just as traditional journalism should not be underestimated123. This is 
because new media facilitates the instantaneous, and often spontaneous, expression of 
opinions and venting and sharing of emotions, thoughts and feelings124. Consequently, 
the internet is saturated with poorly researched, bias and meaningless material. For 
instance, in his Inquiry, Leveson LJ refers to Popbitch that, in his Lordship’s opinion, 
is: ‘clear in its ambition to entertain and understands itself to “poke fun” and 
comment on the “lighter” side of celebrity culture’125.  
 
Despite the best intentions of some serious citizen journalists, they may still 
lack the education, qualifications and experience to distinguish themselves from 
professional journalists. Indeed, bloggers post information despite being uncertain as 
to its provenance and without verifying it for reliability, and instead, rely on readers 
to judge its accuracy126. To the contrary, a blog by a professional journalist may 
include spontaneous comments and conversation, whilst being supported by 
professional experience and resources127. Although Mill’s argument from truth is not 
concerned with these issues, the criticisms levelled at the theory later in this Chapter 
clearly apply128. Furthermore, these concerns are paradigm examples of the rejoinders 
raised in relation to Holmes J marketplace of ideas and the argument from self-
fulfilment129. There exists a symbiosis between citizen journalism and the traditional 
media that has been articulated by a number of commentators. Essentially, this 
relationship is mutually beneficial because professional journalists and traditional 
media entities research and cover the findings of citizen journalism that, sequentially, 
adds credence to the citizen journalist’s work and facilitates the wider dissemination 
of their research130. 
                                                             
123 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 63 
124 Indeed, in April 2014 Facebook emailed its users to inform them that the messages function is 
moving out of the Facebook application due to their Messenger application enabling users to reply 20% 
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125 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, November 
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128 See section 5.3 below 
129 See sections 5.4 and 5.5 below 
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4 TRADITIONAL APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING THE BENEFICIARIES 
OF ‘MEDIA FREEDOM’  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally courts and scholars from different jurisdictions have used the following 
approaches to determine whom and what should benefit from the existence of a 
distinct right to media freedom: the press-as-technology model; the ‘mass audience 
approach’ and; the ‘professionalised’ publisher approach’131. As alluded to above, and 
discussed in more detail below in relation to these approaches, new media’s creation 
of citizen journalism means that the ability to reach mass audiences is no longer the 
reserve of traditional media institutions, or trained journalists. This blurring of the 
lines between our perceptions of the traditional media and citizen journalists has 
created doctrinal uncertainty as to how the courts should determine the beneficiaries 
of ‘media freedom’. Arguably, in the context of new media, these factors can no 
longer be relied upon to distinguish between media and non-media actors. As a result, 
this section will argue that although these approaches may once have been effective, 
they now lack merit and are, potentially, redundant.  
 
4.2 PRESS-AS-TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
 
As previously explored132, the dominant view in the US, based upon the press-as-
technology model, is that the media should not be subject to any privileges or special 
duties133. Accordingly, there is no need to distinguish it at all and, as a result, this 
model does not provide the means to do so. This is because, so the press-as-
technology movement argues, the Framers of the Constitution understood the words 
‘or of the press’ to secure the right of every person to use communications 
technology, as opposed to laying down a right exclusively available to members of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Freedom for the Citizen-Journalist Watchdog Trumps the Right of Informational Privacy on the 
Internet’ (2011) Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 323, 345; J. Curran and J. 
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Routledge, 2010), 286 
131 See generally: J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) 
JML 57-78, 64-68 
132 See section 2.1 above 
133 See generally: E. Volokh, ‘Freedom of the Press as an Industry, or From the Press as a Technology’ 
(2011-12) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459 
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the publishing industry134. As a result, in the view of the Supreme Court, the First 
Amendment protects speech not speakers, regardless of whether the source of the 
expression is a professional journalist or media organisation, or whether it’s a casual 
social media user135. Therefore, in the case of Branzburg v Hayes136, White J, giving 
the opinion of the majority, resisted attempting to conceptualise the media, and define 
what it consists of. In White J’s judgment, this is because: “freedom of the press is a 
fundamental personal right” which is not confined to the mass media but, instead, 
attaches to “every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and 
opinion” 137 . Thus, there appears a concern, echoed, although not necessarily 
supported, in the work of scholars such as Oster, Baker and Amar that, in attempting 
to define the media, there is a risk of creating either an over-inclusive or over-
exclusive interpretation of journalism138. The former could, potentially, be misused139, 
while the latter could give rise to allegations of discrimination140. This is because non-
journalists, who regularly contribute to matters of public importance, such as business 
leaders, scientists and artists, would not fall within the province of the additional 
protection afforded to the media141. However, this argument is, it is submitted, largely 
without merit. Protecting the media with specific provisions or clauses, that provide 
extra privileges and duties, does not mean those who are not part of the institutional 
press would be deprived of their rights. For instance, within the context of ECHR 
jurisprudence, artistic142 and commercial expression143 are subject to a relatively high 
level of protection. Similarly, Article 13 CFREU, and Article 5(3) of the German 
Basic Law protect freedom of science and freedom of the arts. Thus, there is no 
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reason to suggest that, within these legal frameworks at least, privileged protection of 
the media would operate against business leaders, artists or scientists144.  
 
In addition to the argument above, there are wider-reaching reasons why the 
press-as-technology model, and the resistance to defining the media and delineating 
between those who are subject to a right to media freedom over and above those that 
are simply entitled to the right to freedom of expression, are subject to criticism. In 
fact, there is a strong judicial and academic counter-movement in the US that not only 
correlates more closely with ECHR jurisprudence, but also undermines the model 
within the new media era.  
 
It is submitted that the specific media protection clauses enshrined within legal 
instruments, such as Article 11(2) CFREU and the First Amendment, in addition to 
those provisions safeguarding freedom of expression145  strongly suggests that, for 
example, the European Union and the Framers of the US Constitution, intended to 
distinguish the two, in that they could apply to different entities and mean something 
different. Taking the First Amendment as an example, scholars such as Stewart J and 
Bezanson have argued that these provisions must mean something more otherwise 
they would be redundant146. For Stewart J, the First Amendment free press clause 
operates as a structural guarantee to enable the press to fulfil its constitutional 
functions of acting as the Fourth Estate; to provide additional checks and balances on 
the government. Accordingly, the twin speech and press rights are: “no constitutional 
accident, but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press…” 147 
Further, according to West, in addition to the Fourth Estate function, the press fulfils 
another primary role beyond the values served by the general right to freedom of 
expression: dissemination of information of public interest148.  
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In today’s new media era, clearly the institutional press is not the only means 
to provide a check and balance on government, or convey matters of public interest. 
Other forms of media can, and do, fulfil this role effectively149. Consequently, these 
views of the press clause are not exclusively institutional150. The functions of the 
press identified by Stewart J and West, as being conducive to its constitutional role, 
continue to be served by a variety of traditional and new media 151 . Arguably, 
therefore, when constitutions, statutes and normative theory require protection of the 
media in addition to freedom of expression, it is incumbent on the courts to delineate 
between the two, as demonstrated by ECHR jurisprudence, despite the fact that such a 
challenging line-drawing exercise will generate controversial judgments152. Accepting 
the media as a discrete legal institution153 is, it is submitted, vitally important within a 
new media era, in which we can be constantly bombarded by a cacophony of 
information from different forms of media. It is the fulfilment of the unique functions 
identified by Stewart J and West that serves to distinguish the media-as-a-
constitutional-component154 from mere media entertainment, as the activities of the 
latter are not subject to the same legal protection155, at least within an ECHR and 
CFREU context.  
 
4.3 MASS AUDIENCE APPROACH  
According to the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC): ‘Journalism is a function 
shared by a wide range of actors, including professional full-time reporters and 
analysts, as well as bloggers and others who engage in forms of self- publication in 
print, on the internet or elsewhere…’156 On this analysis, anyone with the ability to 
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disseminate information to a mass audience could be considered to be media, and 
therefore be subject to the same privileges157. Historically this approach could have 
enabled a distinction to be made between media and non-media actors as professional 
journalists, and the newspapers, publishers and broadcasters they worked for, tended 
to be the only entities with the ability to reach mass audiences. However, new media’s 
creation of citizen journalists means that this ability is no longer the reserve of these 
organisations and their journalists or broadcasters. Instead, anybody with access to the 
internet can, in theory at least, convey information to millions of people through the 
creation of a blog, posting a YouTube video or using social media, such as Twitter, 
Facebook or Instagram. Indeed, if you consider the reach of sporting celebrities such 
as Cristiano Ronaldo, Andy Murray and Lewis Hamilton through their social media 
accounts, based on the UNHRC’s formulation, they would be considered 
‘journalists’158.  
This situation is paradigmatic of the over-inclusive interpretation of media 
expression envisaged by Oster and Baker outlined above159, as it captures virtually 
every internet publication, including, for instance, tweets by celebrity footballers.  
Furthermore, as discussed above160, clearly the appearance and quality of information 
available on the internet, whether that be through blogs, websites or social media, 
varies drastically. Despite these apparent inconsistencies, the mass audience approach 
would classify a casual tweet from Cristiano Ronaldo as being legally 
indistinguishable to a citizen journalist using their blog to report from a war zone. 
Therefore, it would be incorrect to classify all publications capable of reaching mass 
audiences as media: the internet, as a vehicle through which information can be 
conveyed, must not confused with the media as a legal concept, just as the medium 
‘paper’ does not, necessarily, constitute the press161. Consequently, it is imperative to 
identify diligent journalists operating within the media-as-a-constitutional-component, 
                                                             
157 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 
66-67 
158 By way of example, at the time of writing, Cristiano Ronaldo has 37.1 million followers on Twitter 
alone. Also, on Twitter, Lewis Hamilton has 2.8 million, Rory McIlroy has 2.5 million and Roger 
Federer and Andy Murray have 3.2 million followers each. 
159 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 
65; C.E. Baker, ‘The Independent Significance of the Press Clause under Existing Law’ (2007) 35 
Hofstra Law Review 955, 1013-1016 
160 See section 3.2 
161 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 67 
 24 
regardless of the form that takes, and distinguish these from media entertainment and 
other information. 
4.4 ‘PROFESSIONALISED’ PUBLISHER APPROACH 
  
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR regularly refer to ‘media professionals’162. Thus, in cases such as Perrin v 
UK163 and Willem v France164 the ECtHR did not grant protection to private and non-
professional internet publications. This view is mirrored in the US in that, for 
example, under New York shield law, only ‘professional journalists’ working for 
‘gain or livelihood’165 are entitled to benefit from special journalistic dispensations166. 
These positions lend support to an approach whereby a publisher must be connected 
with, and remunerated by, a traditional media company, and/or have undertaken 
formal journalistic education and training to benefit from privileges attributed to 
media freedom.  
 
 In contrast to the mass audience approach, it is submitted that this approach 
animates concerns of over-exclusivity167 , for reasons that are relevant within the 
context of new media. Firstly, who amounts to a professional journalist cannot be 
defined by membership of a professional body, as unlike lawyers and doctors, 
journalists are not required to be members of such organisations. Secondly, just 
because a person has not undergone formal journalistic education or training does not 
mean they cannot be diligent and professional reporters. Equally, requiring that a 
person be employed by a professional media organisation eliminates anyone not 
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subject to regular remuneration. This would include freelancers, bloggers and social 
media commentators, despite the fact their work may contribute to matters of public 
interest168. 
 
 The ‘professionalised’ publisher approach is unconvincing when considering 
that private blogs can be the only source of news coverage from, for example, war 
zones, as was the case during the Arab Spring uprising169. In contrast, educated and 
professionally trained journalists, employed by media organisations, do not always 
write or broadcast material that is in the public interest170. Instead, this work may be 
subject to conflicting interests, such as commercialism 171 . Thus, establishing a 
presumption that a tabloid journalist reporting on a ‘kiss-and-tell’ story should be 
subject to greater legal protection, under the auspices of media freedom, than a private 
citizen journalist diligently blogging from an area embroiled in conflict, merely 
because the former is remunerated by a media organisation, and is professionally 
trained and educated is, it is submitted, unmeritorious and illogical172. The former 
could be classed as mere media entertainment, whilst the later is paradigmatic of the 
media-as-a-constitutional-component. 
 
5 THE MEDIA-AS-A-CONSTITUTIONAL-COMPONENT: A FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH TO DISTINGUISHING THE MEDIA FROM NON-MEDIA ACTORS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous section has established the shortfalls of the traditional methods adopted 
by courts and scholars for distinguishing between media and non-media actors: they 
simply do not fit in the new media arena. Based on a combination of jurisprudence 
and scholarship, and by recourse to the philosophical rationales underpinning freedom 
of expression and the media, this section will attempt to formulate a functional media-
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as-a-constitutional-component approach that, theoretically and normatively, justifies 
the media as a distinct legal institution. It will argue that the performance of a 
constitutional function should define the beneficiaries of media freedom, as opposed 
to the individual being defined as media, simply based upon their employment or 
training.  Ultimately, it seeks to establish the egalitarian principle that media freedom, 
and its privileges, attach to the constitutional component, and could therefore apply to 
anyone serving a constitutional function: that is, operating as the Fourth Estate and/or 
disseminating information of public interest to an audience.  
5.2 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION JUSTIFICATIONS AND THEIR 
APPLICATION TO MEDIA FREEDOM 
As stated by Fenwick and Phillipson, freedom of expression is regarded as being one 
of the most fundamental rights173. Justification for its protection is underpinned by 
philosophical theories. These are the: (i) argument from truth; (ii) marketplace of 
ideas174 ; (iii) argument from self-fulfilment; (iv) argument from democratic self-
governance. This philosophical foundation is apparent, to varying degrees, within 
contemporary domestic jurisprudence and, that of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)175. For instance, the House of Lords recognised the existence of all of 
these rationales in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms176, 
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where Lord Steyn stated the often repeated passage177 that freedom of expression 
“serves a number of broad objectives”, and is intrinsically valuable because:  
“First, it promotes the self-fulfilment of individuals in society. Secondly, in the famous 
words of Mr Justice Holmes (echoing John Stuart Mill), ‘the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’… 
Thirdly, freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy. The free flow of information 
and ideas informs political debate…”178 
 Leading commentators, including Dworkin 179 , Schauer 180 , Greenwalt 181 , 
Raz182, Barendt183, Wragg184 and Fenwick and Phillipson185, have already provided 
rich and extensive coverage of these arguments, exploration of which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis186. Instead, this section seeks to do the following: advance the 
proposition that the argument from democratic self-governance is better suited than 
the arguments from self-fulfilment and truth, and the marketplace of ideas, to 
underpin new media, and provide a workable definition of ‘the media’ as a 
constitutional component, that effectively delineates it from non-media actors. 
5.3 THE ARGUMENT FROM TRUTH 
The argument from truth is located in John Stuart Mill’s 19th Century text On Liberty 
and, predominantly, his essay, Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion187 . The 
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overall thrust of Mill’s argument is that truth is most likely to emerge from totally 
uninhibited freedom of thought, and almost absolute freedom of expression 188 . 
Consequently, thought and discussion protects individual liberty from its predominant 
threat 189 , which is not “political oppression” 190 , but “social tyranny” 191 : a 
“tyrannical majority”192 that does not allow for autonomous thought, expression or 
opposition, but instead requires absolute accord with its own ideas and opinions193.  
As will be seen below, in relation to the four facets of Mill’s argument, it is 
subject to a conflict between the discoverability of truth, and the constant need for 
disagreement about that truth 194 . Mill argues that truth does not, always and 
immediately triumph, but rather, that it will continually be subject to rediscovery, and 
will eventually emerge victorious, despite suppression195. 
According to Schauer, for Mill, the issue is not certain truth; instead, his 
primary concern is “epistemic advance”196. Indeed, Mill regards truth, at times, as 
merely a by-product of open discussion197. Thus, of paramount importance to Mill is 
not the discovery of truth, but the process of discussion and debate198. Mill argues that 
the foundations and reasoning upon which opinions are based must be continually 
tested and, as result, the acceptance of alternative views by others, and ultimately the 
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reliable discovery of truth, must derive from effective persuasion, rather than 
coercion199.  
The argument has four facets. Firstly, the state would expose its own fallibility 
if it suppresses opinion on account of that opinion’s perceived falsity as, in fact, it 
may be true200. Secondly, even if the suppressed opinion is objectively false, it has 
some value, as it may (and in Mill’s opinion very commonly does) contain an element 
of truth201. Thirdly, since the dominant opinion on any given subject is rarely, or 
never, the whole truth, what remains will only appear as a result of the collision of 
adverse opinions202. Finally, notwithstanding the third facet, even if the received 
opinion is not only true, but the entire truth, unless it is rigorously discussed and 
debated, it will not carry the same weight, as the rationale behind it may not be fully 
and accurately comprehended203. Consequently, unless opinions can be frequently and 
freely challenged, by forcing those holding them to defend their views, the very 
meaning and essence of that true belief may, itself, be weakened, become ineffective, 
or even lost204: In Mill’s words, the true belief: “will be held as a dead dogma, not a 
living truth”205.  
As articulated by Wragg, Mill values open discussion and debate 
instrumentally and intrinsically206: “as a condition of that rationality and belief which 
he conceives of as a characteristic feature of a free man”207. Mill argues that there 
should be: “freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or 
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speculative, scientific, moral or theological”208. Accordingly, the very existence of 
disagreement is critical to the health of society209 and the type or quality of expression 
is irrelevant, as the “usefulness of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion” and to 
make an assessment of quality is an “assumption of infallibility” 210 . Thus, as 
advanced by Fenwick and Phillipson, it appears that Mill envisaged the argument to 
apply to the expression of opinion and debate. However, it can also be used in support 
of freedom of information claims as: “the possession of pertinent information about a 
subject will nearly always be a prerequisite to the formation of a well-worked-out 
opinion on the matter”211. 
Despite Schauer’s argument that the desirability of truth within society is 
almost universally accepted212, and the fact that this view seems to correlate with 
Jacob LJ’s obiter dicta in L’Oreal SA v Bellure NV 213  that, pursuant to various 
international laws214, “the right to tell – and to hear – the truth has high international 
recognition” 215 , the assumption derived from the argument, that freedom of 
expression leads to truth, can be attacked on a number of fronts216. Firstly, there is not 
necessarily a causal link between freedom of expression and the discovery of truth217. 
This is particularly pertinent with regard to the new media landscape, where anybody 
can express opinions or views, or disseminate information. Consequently, new media 
outlets are saturated with information that is inaccurate, misleading or untrue. 
Secondly, despite Jacob LJ’s dicta, there is no right to truth per se 218 . Further, 
                                                             
208 J. Mill, On Liberty, in J.M. Robson (Ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, (University of 
Toronto Press, 1977), 226 
209 P. Wragg, ‘Mill’s dead dogma: the value of truth to free speech jurisprudence’, Public Law (2013), 
Apr, 363-385, 365 
210 J. Mill, On Liberty, in J.M. Robson (Ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, (University of 
Toronto Press, 1977), 233-234; See also: K.C. O’Rourke, John Stuart Mill and Freedom of Expression 
The genesis of a theory, (Routledge, 2001), 108 
211 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 15 
212 F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 17; See 
also J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Prentice-Hall, 1973), 26 
213 [2010] EWCA Civ 535 
214 Article 19 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 19(2) International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights; Article 10(1) European Convention on Human Rights; Article 11(1) Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: [2010] EWCA Civ 535, [10] 
215 [2010] EWCA Civ 535, [10] 
216 For commentary criticising the argument from truth in relation to pornography, see: C. MacKinnon, 
Feminism Unmodified, (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 166; H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media 
Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University Press, 2006), 309-407 
217 F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 15 
218 P. Wragg, ‘Mill’s dead dogma: the value of truth to free speech jurisprudence’, Public Law (2013), 
Apr, 363-385, 372 
 31 
contrary to Schauer’s statement, arguably the dissemination of truth is not always a 
good thing. In some situations, the protection of other, countervailing values, should 
take precedent. Ironically, this is illustrated by the international instruments referred 
to by Jacob LJ in L’Oreal. Taking the ECHR as an example, Article 10(1) is qualified 
by Article 10(2), which enables expression, and therefore both truths and untruths, to 
be legitimately withheld on grounds of, inter alia, health or morals, national security, 
public safety, protecting the reputation and honour of private individuals, the 
prevention of disorder or crime and breach of confidence. Equally, this can be applied 
to trade secrets, medical information, data protection, confidentiality agreements, or 
official secrecy. Within the context of new media, the revenge porn phenomenon 
illustrates this dichotomy. This new offence, which exists by virtue of section 33 of 
the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, was essentially created to combat 
individuals sharing, via text messages and social media, sexually explicit content of 
ex-partners without that person’s permission219. Although the explicit pictures, videos 
and accompanying text may well be ‘true’, the dissemination of this content could, 
clearly, harm the victim’s health and morals, their reputation and honour and be a 
misuse of private information220. Thus, as Barendt argues: “[i]t is not inconsistent to 
defend a ban on the publication of propositions on the ground that their propagation 
would seriously damage society, while conceding that they might be true.”221 
5.4 THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
This theory originates from the jurisprudence of US judges. Although it is a distinct 
theory, it is generally regarded as deriving from Mill’s argument from truth222. The 
theory emanates from Justice Holmes judgment in Abrams v United States223 , in 
which it was asserted that: “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market.” 224  Subsequently, Holmes J’s 
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judgment garnered support from other influential judges, including: Justice Brandeis 
in Whitney v California 225 ; Justice Hand in United States v Dennis 226  and 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v NLRB227; and, Justice Frankfurter 
in Dennis v United States228 who observed that: “the history of civilization is in 
considerable measure the displacement of error which once held sway as official 
truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded other truths. Therefore, of man to search 
for truth ought not be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge”229. 
According to the theory, an open and unregulated market, which allows for ideas to 
be traded through the free expression of all opinions, is most likely to lead to the truth 
and, consequently, increased knowledge230. Therefore, the examination of an opinion 
within the ‘marketplace’ subjects it to a test that is more reliable than individual or 
governmental appraisal231. 
 One interpretation of the theory is that discovering truth is dependent upon 
unregulated competition in the actual, as opposed to ideal marketplace232. To the 
contrary, it is arguable that it is grounded in relativism, in that the ideas that emanate 
from the competitive market are the truth, leaving nothing more to be said233. Oster 
relies heavily upon this rationale to distinguish media from non-media actors234. In his 
view, because of the media’s power and ability to communicate via multiple channels, 
the theory dictates that the media should be subject to protection and only minimal 
restriction. This is because this ‘privilege’ for journalists encourages the 
dissemination of more information that, sequentially, generates more valuable, 
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truthful information235. However, it is submitted that this reasoning is flawed, as it is 
the very reasons used by Oster to support his approach that renders the theory 
unsuitable to that which it has been applied. Indeed, according to Barendt, whatever 
interpretation is adopted, the theory “rests on shaky grounds”236 for reasons that can 
be applied to both traditional and new media237.  
Firstly, if the assertion that one statement is stronger than another (whether 
these statements are communicated via a tweet, or a post on Facebook or YouTube, or 
whether they are printed in a traditional newspaper) cannot be intellectually supported 
and defended, the notion of truth loses its integrity 238 , as history demonstrates: 
falsehood frequently triumphs over truth, to the detriment of society239. Secondly, the 
theory assumes that recipients of the communication consider what they read or view 
within the context of the ‘marketplace’ rationally; deciding whether to accept or reject 
it, based on whether it will improve their lifestyle, and society generally 240 . As 
Barendt suggests, this assumption is unrealistic, and over-optimistic 241 . Both 
criticisms are pertinent to new media, which proliferates a huge amount of 
information that is poorly researched or simply untrue, yet has the potential to, and 
very often does emerge as the dominant ‘view’242 regardless of the detrimental impact 
this may have on society. Thirdly, and of particular relevance to the traditional media, 
insofar as this theory relates to truth discovery, its integrity is contingent upon the 
sincerity and truthfulness of the speaker, and therefore assumes that the marketplace 
contains expression that solely represents the views of the proponents of, for instance, 
publications or broadcasts, as opposed to being conveyed on the basis of restrictions 
such as editorial control, ownership, political bias or increased commercial revenue 
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through advertising and/or sales243. This may be true within the context of new media, 
where there are, in theory at least, less restrictions. Although, this is not always the 
case, as many bloggers may simply regurgitate false, bias or misleading 
information244. In relation to the traditional media, this assumption is unrealistic, as 
many media outlets are driven by these restrictions, to the detriment of investigative 
journalism245. 
5.5 THE ARGUMENT FROM SELF-FULFILMENT  
Endorsement of this argument as a justification for freedom of expression of broad 
application246  can be found in the jurisprudence of a number of jurisdictions. In 
Simms, Lord Steyn stated that freedom of expression “…promotes the self-fulfilment 
of individuals in society”247; in Handyside v United Kingdom the ECtHR considered 
that the right is “one of the basic conditions…for the development of man” 248 ; 
Thurgood Marshall J, in the US Supreme Court case of Procunier v Martinez held 
that it “…serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit – a 
spirit that demands self-expression”249.  
The argument is based on the individual liberty paradigm; that individuals 
must be able to express themselves250. Pursuant to this theory, freedom of expression 
is afforded protection, as it is integral to an individual’s need for self-fulfilment and 
development 251 . Contrarily, suppression of expression is an affront to personal 
dignity252, as this undermines equality of respect afforded to individuals to exercise 
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their moral powers of reason and rationality 253 . Consequently, if expression 
contributes to the speaker’s values and visions, it should be subject to protection254.  
Scholars such as Nimmer, Nestler and Fargo and Alexander argue that media 
expression, by virtue of constitutional functions, is far less significant under this 
rationale compared with the argument from democratic self-governance255. This is 
because, pursuant to this argument, freedom of expression emanates from the role of 
the speaker, not the speaker’s impact on society256. While a professional or citizen 
journalist may claim personal gratification and fulfilment from their publications, this 
rationale does not apply to media companies, as these entities cannot be fulfilled 
through expression as a natural person can. Thus, media freedom is not inherently 
valuable on a personal level257. Instead, it is instrumentally and functionally valuable, 
as it protects individuals and legal persons fulfilling a constitutional role for society, 
rather than protecting expression for expression’s sake. 
5.6 THE ARGUMENT FROM DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE 
This argument is the most fashionable of the justifications in Western democracies258 
and, it is submitted, is best suited to underpin new media and support the notion of the 
media-as-a-constitutional component. It is based on the premise that the predominant 
purpose of freedom of expression is to protect the right of citizens to understand 
political matters in order to facilitate and enable societal engagement with the 
political and democratic process 259 . Ultimately, an informed electorate is a 
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prerequisite of democracy. Therefore, “there must be no constraints on the free flow 
of information and ideas”260 . According to Bork, speech regarding “government 
behaviour, policy or personnel, whether…executive, legislative, judicial or 
administrative”261 was the original subject that was perceived as being protected by 
the right to freedom of expression262. However, commentators such as Milo, Oster 
and Chesterman observe that the scope of this approach was seen as being overly 
restrictive263, as focusing purely on political expression to the exclusion of other 
matters of public interest gave rise to an “old-fashioned distinction between public 
and private power” 264 . Consequently, Alexander Meiklejohn, with whom this 
argument is now primarily associated 265 , argued for the substitution of political 
expression with the wider, and less restrictive notion of ‘public discussion’, relating to 
any matter of public interest, as opposed to expression linked purely to the casting of 
votes266. Meiklejohn stated that public discussion is speech which impacts “directly 
or indirectly, upon the issues with which voters have to deal [i.e.] to matters of public 
interest”267. A result of this bifurcated interpretation of free speech is a two-tiered 
approach to freedom of expression268: expression that is not in the interest of the 
public, is not protected, and is therefore open to restriction to protect the general 
welfare of society269. In later writings, Meiklejohn clarified this wider view of ‘public 
discussion’, by stating that voting is merely the “external expression of a wide and 
diverse number of activities by means of which citizens attempt to meet the 
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responsibilities of making judgments”270 . Accordingly, education, philosophy and 
science, literature and the arts, and public discussions on public issues, are activities 
that will educate citizens for self-government271. 
 Historically, due to its reach, it was incumbent upon the traditional media to 
disseminate matters of public interest, and to act as the public watchdog and Fourth 
Estate; to provide a check and balance on government. Consequently, the ECtHR has 
consistently stated that media freedom provides one of the best means for the public 
to discover and form opinions about the ideas and attitudes of political leaders, and on 
other matters of general interest, and that the public has a right to receive this 
information272. However, as explored above273, this role can be fulfilled by both the 
traditional media and, by virtue of new media, citizen journalists. Therefore, it is 
submitted that this argument helps to define the media by providing a clear 
delineation between media and non-media actors. Pursuant to its ‘public discussion’ 
scope, this rationale underpins the media-as-a-constitutional-component concept, as it 
supports media freedom protection, beyond that afforded to private individuals 
pursuant to the right to freedom of expression, for any actor that contributes regularly 
and widely to the dissemination of matters of public interest and/or operates as a 
public watchdog. 
5.7 MEDIA PRIVILEGE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The prevailing sections have established that media freedom grants protection beyond 
that afforded by freedom of expression to media actors fulfilling the media-as-a-
constitutional-component concept. However, media that, pursuant to this concept, is 
subject to these privileges, beyond private individuals, is also subject to duties and 
responsibilities in excess of those expected of non-media entities. As has been 
discussed throughout this Chapter, the reach of both the traditional and new media, 
including citizen journalists, does not just enable it to fulfil its constitutional 
functions. This power can be abused in equal measure. Due to the reach of the media, 
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the potential impact of abuse of power is far greater than those emanating from 
private individuals. The media is not just capable of invading private lives of 
individuals, or damaging reputations, but it can also shape and mislead public 
opinion.  
Therefore, the argument from democratic self-governance endorses a two-
tiered approach to media expression274. Firstly, public discussion should be protected. 
However, if the expression is not of public interest, it should not be afforded the same 
level of protection compared to that which is of public concern. This includes speech 
primarily concerned with commercial or financial matters 275 , speech relating to 
private or intimate matters276, and hate speech277. Further, it is submitted that the 
argument from democratic self-governance rationale, and its public discussion ambit, 
dictates that the media’s privileged protection, pursuant to it being a constitutional 
component, is subject to it acting ethically and in good faith, and publishing or 
broadcasting material that is based on reasonable research to verify the provenance of 
it and its sources. Incidentally, the only legal instruments that qualify the right to free 
speech or expression with express reference to these extra duties and responsibilities 
are Article 10(2) ECHR and Article 19(3) ICCPR. These qualification clauses apply 
to both media and non-media entities however, according to Oster, their main purpose 
is to provide member states with a tool to combat abuses of power by the media278.  
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Consequently, and in conclusion, the privilege afforded to the media, deriving 
primarily from the wide ambit of the argument from democratic self-governance, is 
based upon a utilitarian, consequentialist and functional understanding of media 
freedom. The media-as-a-constitutional-component concept means that media actors 
are protected for disseminating matters of public interest, and operating as the public 
watchdog/Fourth estate, and therefore fulfilling functions beneficial to society. 
However, this protection carries with it the obligation to fulfil these functions. If it 
fails to do this, it relinquishes its protection and may be subject to criminal or civil 
liability. 
6 CONCLUSION: A WORKABLE DEFINITION OF ‘THE MEDIA’ WITHIN THE 
TRANSITIONAL ERA 
Based on the media-as-a-constitutional-component concept of media freedom that has 
been advanced throughout this paper, it is suggested that an egalitarian principle 
should be adopted to define the media. This principle and its definition will focus on 
the functions that are performed by the media actors, as opposed to their inherent 
characteristics. Therefore, media freedom does not have to be a purely institutional 
privilege; it can apply to any actor that conforms to the definition. As a consequence 
of the requirement that these functions are fulfilled in order to satisfy the 
constitutional component concept, it will also give consideration to the obligations of 
the media. Pursuant to the scholarship and jurisprudence from both the US and 
Europe, examined in prevailing sections, the following definition of media is, 
therefore, proposed: ‘(1) a natural and legal person (2) engaged in the process of 
gathering information of public concern, interest and significance (3) with the 
intention, and for the purpose of, disseminating this information to a mass audience 
(4) whilst complying with standards governing the research, newsgathering and 
editorial process’279. 
 As the media’s privileged protection is based upon the constitutional 
component concept, which derives from the argument from democratic self-
                                                                                                                                                                              
Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, [30] per Lord Phillips), and now enshrined within section 4 of 
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279 Compare Oster and Ugland for definitions from a European and US perspective respectively: J. 
Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 74; E. 
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governance, one of the fundamental requirements for determining that an actor is 
media is its contribution to matters of public interest. Oster’s argument that for this 
requirement to be fulfilled it must occur periodically280  is, it is submitted, over-
exclusive. Actors can fulfil the definition above, and operate as a constitutional 
component, on one-off occasions or on an ad-hoc basis281. This is particularly the case 
within a new media context, in which contributions to the public interest can be made 
via many different platforms.  
 Scholarship and jurisprudence from the US, England and Wales and the 
ECtHR suggests that this requirement could be met with differences of opinion. From 
a US scholarship perspective, it is likely to be opposed on a doctrinal basis, as content 
discrimination is not permitted under the First Amendment 282 . To the contrary 
however, according to Sunstein: ‘…it would be difficult to imagine a sensible system 
of free expression that did not distinguish among categories of speech in accordance 
with their importance to the underlying purposes of the free speech guarantee’.283 
Indeed, the US Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeal, House of Lords and 
Supreme Court have made consistent reference to the public interest requirement. As 
Oster observes284, the courts have expressed this in a number of ways, including: 
‘public interest’ or ‘public concern’285; ‘of political, social or other concern to the 
community’286; ‘influences social relations and politics on a grand scale,’; or is part of 
a ‘debate about public affairs’; makes a ‘contribution to the public debate’; 
stimulating ‘political and social changes’287. Similarly, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
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provides rich precedent supporting the public interest requirement. It has regularly 
referred to ‘matters of general public interest’ and ‘matters of public concern’ within a 
variety of different circumstances. The principle has been applied to, amongst many 
other things288: national and local level political speech and reporting289; criticism of 
public administration and justice290; abuse of police power291; criticisms of businesses 
and those operating businesses 292 . Hence, according to the ECtHR, publishing 
material relating exclusively to private matters or on ‘tawdry allegations’ and 
‘sensational and…lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at 
satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of a person’s 
strictly private life’ and serving to ‘entertain’ rather than ‘educate’ is not in the public 
interest293.  
These situations referred to by the ECtHR relate to mere entertainment, as 
opposed to the fulfilment of a constitutional function pursuant to the media-as-a-
constitutional-component and the proposed definition. In such situations, a publisher 
is not fulfilling their constitutional function, or role as public watchdog within a 
democracy. Consequently, they should not be subject to the privileges attached to 
media freedom. Thus, this proposed definition of the media has the potential to 
exclude from media privileges actors that have, traditionally, been considered part of 
the media, and subject to the protection offered by media freedom, despite their 
purpose being to primarily treat ‘the private lives of those in the public eye’ as ‘a 
highly lucrative commodity’ by exposing aspects of people’s private lives or engaging 
in entertainment and sensationalism. These actors and entities do not conform to the 
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requirements of the definition by publishing material that contributes to the 
dissemination of matters of public interest. 
 
  
 
